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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
All crimes involving the elemcnt of fraud3 3 have been held to involve
moral turpitude within the mcaning of the deportation statute. 4  Fraud
has been used as the test in determining whether lesser crimes involve
moral turpitude.35 State court decisions also show a unanimity of opinion
that crimes tinged with fraud involve moral turpitude.," Since fraud against
persons denotes moral turpitude,77 a fortiori fraud against the government
involves moral turpitude, "for such is malun in se, contrary to justice,
honesty, principle and good morals.'' 3 8 Inasmuch as defrauding tile govern-
ment is found to be immoral, it is self-evident that conspiring to violate
the revenue laws of the country involves noral turpitude.3 ,
In a carefully written, analytical opinion, the Court judged the instant
case upon the finly imbedded touchstone of fraud. Accordingly, the
alien was deported. ITe dissent presented many forceful and logical
arguments against this result based chiefly upon the proposition that the
phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" has no sufficiently definite mean-
ing to be a constitutional'4 standard for deportation. Because of the penal
nature4 of deportation and the uncertainty of the phrase it is submitted
that in the interest of unifornity and equal treatment before the lawA2
Congress should set a more definite standard.
EVIDENCE-BLOOD GROUPING TESTS IN PATERNITY SUITS
Plaintiff, in a suit for support of herself and child, objected to
defendant's motion for an order compelling a blood grouping test. By
33. Maita v. Haff, supra note 18 (engaging in business of distiller of alcohol with
intent to defraud the United States of tax); Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 648 (1939) (conspiring to smuggle alcohol into the United
States with intent to defraud the government in violation of the Tariff Act of 1930);
Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1938) (conspiring to defraud a person by deceit
and falsehood); United States ex ret. Popoff v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 513 (12th Cir. 1935)
(fraudulently aiding an alien not entitled to naturalization to obtain citizenship); United
States ex rei. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1931) (forgery, since it involves
an intent to defraud); United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F,2d 57 (8th Cir.
1928) (concealing assets from trustee in bankruptcy); Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736 (D.
Mass. 1934) (using mails to defraud); United States ex ret Millard v. Tuttle, 46 F.2d
342 (E.D. La. 1930) (incumbering mortgaged property with intent to defraud); United
States ex ret. Portada v. Day, 16 F.2d 328 (S.D. N.Y. 1926) (willful intent to defraud by
issuance of check without funds under California law).
34. See note 1 supra.
35. See United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1940).
36. See Jordan v. De Ceorge, 71 Sup. Ct. 703, 706 n. 13 (1951).
37. United States ex ret. Medich v. Burmaster, supra note 33; United States ex rel.
Millard v, Tuttle, supra note 33.
38. See United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, supra note 19 at 769.
39. United States ex ret. Berlandi v. Reimer, soupra note 19.
40. The argument is that the statute is penal, and since it does not provide a defi-
nitely ascertainable standard, it is "void for vagueness" under the "due process clause,"
U. S. CONST. ASSEND. V.
41. See Fong flaw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948), reversing 162 F.2d 633
(9th Cir. 1947) (deportation is equivalent to banishment or exile).
42. As against citizens the alien suffers the additional penalty of deportation.
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statute', a court may, in a civil suit where paternity is in issue, order any
party and the child involved to submit to such a test, and receive the
results thereof into evidence when they definitely exclude the alleged father
as a possible father. The trial court's refusal to order a blood grouping
test was reversed. Held, it is, in the absence of special circumstances, a
substantial abuse of the trial court's judicial discretion to refuse to utilize
this accepted tool of evidence whenever the issue of paternity is material.
Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J.S. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
The performance of a blood grouping test2 is governed by theory
based on established laws of heredity, " and test results are universally
accepted by scientific and medical authorities as conclusive proof of non-
paternity.4 Variations between the blood characteristics of the alleged
father and those which would necessarily be in the blood of the actual
father are the basis for a determination of non-paternity5. Therefore, as
new characteristics are discovered, an increasing proportion of men can
be excluded as the father of a given child.0 The results of tests for the
groupings now known will exonerate approximately one out of two men
wrongly accused of paternity.7 Since our courts admit evidence of the test
results only when they prove non-paternity,8 it is obviously advisable for
any man being sued for the support of his alleged child to request that
the tests be made. It follows that such tests can only damage the position
1, N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:99-4 (Cur. Supp. 1950).
2, "Blood grouping test" usually designates the determination of one or all of known
blood characteristics, including: groups A, B, AB, 0; types M, N, MN; and the Rh and
Hr factors. See 46 ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEIY OF SCIrCES Art. 9 pp. 887-
98, 927-38, 969-92 (1946).
3. Report of the Committee on Medicolegal Blood Grouping Tests, 108 A.M.A.J.
2138, 2139 (1939): "Summary ... laws of heredity:
1. The agglutinogens A and B cannot appear in the blood of a child unless present in the
blood of one or both parents. 2. Individuals in groups AB cannot have children of group
0, and group 0 individuals cannot have group AB children. * * * "... 1. The agglutin-
ogens M and N cannot appear in the blood of a child unless present in the blood of one
or both parents. 2. A type M parent cannot have a type N child and a type N parent
cannot have a type M child, regardless of the type of the second parent." Keeffc and
Bailey, A Trial of Bastardy is a Trial of the Blood, 34 CORNT..L L. Q. 72, 75 (1948),
"(1) Factors RH0 , rh', rh", and Hr cannot appear in the blood of a child unless present
in the blood of one or both parents. (2) Parents of types Rh,Rh, and rh'rh' cannot have
children of types rh, Rh0 , Rh., or rh" and parents of types rh, Rh,, Rh, or rh" cannot
have children of Rh,Rh, or rh'rh'." SCHATKIN, DIsPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDNGS 134-
49 (2d ed. 1947); WIENER, BLOOD-GROUPS AND TRANSFUSIONS 161-97, 245-54 (3d ed.
1945).
4. Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670 (Me. 1949); Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St, 305,
58 N.E.2d 773 (1944); WIENER, op. cit. supra note 3; Wiener, The Judicial WVeight of
Blood Grouping Tests Results, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOcY 523 (1941); 108 A.M.A.J.
2138 (1939); cf. Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945) (quoting SCHATKRIN,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 225 [c. 8 The Unerring Accuracy of Blood Tests]).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. SCHATKIN, op. cit. suopra note 3, at 158; Keeffe and Bailey, supra note 3, at 75.
7. See NVIENER, op. cit. suopra note 3, at 385 (disputed maternity, as interchange in
hospitals, solution in over 40% of the cases).
8. E.g., Jordan v. Mace, supra note 4; Statutes, infra note 28. But see 63 tIARv. L.
REv. 1271. 1272 (1950) (suggesting they be admitted to show probability in some cases).
9. But cf. Vollock v. Brigham, 72 S. D. 278, 33 N.W.2d 285 (1948) (wife mis-
takenly thought tests proved paternity).
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of the woman,' who may otherwise have a good case based on circum-
stantial evidence;" for that reason, she is always the party who resists
them. Knowledge of the physical facts concerning the blood characteristics
of those involved may, therefore, prove useful to all attorney preparing a
disputed paternity case. These characteristics can be determined quickly
and inexpensively by any reputable hospital or blood bank laboratory, 12
as is done for blood transfusions.
When the tests are voluntarily submitted to,'3 there seems no doubt
that evidence of the blood groups of the parties will be accepted in the
form of expert testimony.'4 However, when the mother refuses to submit
herself and her child to the tests, a problem arises as to the power of the
courts to secure this evidence by ordering that blood groupings be made.' 5
A federal and some state courts " have found authority to order the tests
by construing existing statutes'7 authorizing such physical examinations
as are necessary, as for example those in personal injury cases. Other
courts find inherent authority to ferret out the truth by drawing an
analogy to fingerprinting and similar compulsions, Objections to ordering
the tests have ordinarily been based on some theory of constitutional
privilege such as that against self-incrimination.20 Although this par-
ticular ground might otherwise have some validity, 2' there is authority
indicating that the privilege against self-incrimination will be limited to
10. See State v. Wright, 59 Ohio App. 191, 197, 17 N.E.2d 428, 431 (1938). See
Waybright, Florida's New Juvenile Court Ate, 6 MIAMI L. Q. 1 (1951).
11. See discussion, Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (married woman
usually helped by restriction of testimony as to non-access and by presumption of legiti-
macy); Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 65, 169 P.2d 442 (1946) (exhibition of child to
jury); SCHATICIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 118-29 (evidence of resemblance).
12. Keeffe and Bailey, supra note 3, at 80 (transfusions). It should be remem-
bered that an expert serologist's testimony would be required upon trial of the case. See
SCHATKIN, ofp. cit. supra note 3, at 181-82.
13. See Berry v. Chaplin, suprd note 11; State v. Wright, sup/ra note 10.
14. E.g., Walker v. Clark, supra note 4; \VcIGeOE, EvnErcz §§ 26, 165a (3d ed.
1940).
15. See Comm. v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 Atl. 298 (1936); Calton, Blood-
Grouping Tests and their Relationship to the Law, 17 ORE. L. RkEv. 177 (1937); Lee,
Blood Tests for Paternity, 12 A.B.A.J. 441 (1926); Maguire, A Survey of Blood Group
Decisions and Legislation in the American Law of Evidence, 16 So. CALIF. L. Rev. 161
(1943).
16. Beach v. Beach, supra note 11; ef. Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S.
172 (1900); Hayt v. Brewster & Co., 199 App. Div. 68, 189 N. Y. Supp. 907 (1921).
See Lee, supra note 15.
17. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b).
18. Anthony v. Anthony, 9 N. 1. Super. 411, 74 A.2d 919 (1950); State v. Damm,
64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936); cf. State v. Wright, supra note 10; Calton, supra
note 15, at 208.
19. See Maguire, supra note 15, at 168 et seq.
20. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (1940).
21. Especially in criminal cases not involving paternity, e.g., Shanks v. State, 185 Md.
437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945); or divorce cases whenever adultery is a crime, see 8 WIGMORE,
EvimENcE § 2257 (3d ed. 1940).
CASES NOTED
spoken evidence.2 2 Other such theories as violation of the rights to privacy,23
to freedom of the person,2 ' and of due process"5 have definitely been
rejected on grounds of public necessity. -" A different objection, based on
the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock, affords no valid
basis for not ordering the tests, as the presumption is rebuttable.2 7 A few
states have statutes 1 which authorize the tests to be ordered by the trial
court in either criminalU or civil 0 cases, or in both, upon motion of
the defendant only, 3' or of any party.3 2 Most of these statutes provide
that refusal to submit to the tests may be disclosed to the jury. 33 Even
under these statutes a trial court that refuses to order the tests is usually
upheld on the constitutional theories discussed above,34 or for failure to
prove the evidentiary value of the requested tests.35  However, such
statutory authority has enabled the tests to be used quite freely in some
jurisdictions.36
An even sharper conflict arises regarding the weight to be given
the results of the tests, once admitted by whatever means.37 These results
are considered expert opinion testimony.38 However, in some jurisdictions,
without contradicting the doctrine that conclusions drawn from test re-
sults are only expert opinion, the courts have overruled verdicts contrary
22. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); State v. Calton, 60 Ohio App. 192,
20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); see WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 21, at § 2265; 24 MICH. L.
REV. 617 (1926).
23. See Maguire, supra note 15, at 168; 23 VA. L. REV. 450, 455 (1937).
24. See Comm. v. English, supra note 15, at 171, 300.
25. Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization for insanity); Jacobson v.
Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination).
26. Anthony v. Anthony, supra note 18; Van Camp v. Welling, 6 Ohio Ops. 371
(1936).
27. Anthony v. Anthony, supra note 18; Walker v. Clark, supra note 4. Contra,
Harding v. Harding, 122 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 19401.
28. ME. REV. STAT. c. 153, § 34 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE CEN. LAws art. 12, §
17 (Cum. Supp. 1947) N.C. GEN. STAT. Ar. § 8-50.1 (Cur. Supp. 1951); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2:99-3,4 (Cum. Supp. 1950); N.Y. CalM. CODE § 684-2; N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAw § 12 6-a; OIo GEN. ConE ANN. § 12122-1, 2 (Supp. 1950); S.D. CODE § 36.0602
(1939); WIs. STAT. §§ 166.105, 325.23 (1949).
29. Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota
and Wisconsin.
30. New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
31. Maine, Maryland, New York and Ohio.
32. New Jersey, North Carolina, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
33. Except in New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota and Wisconsin
civil actions, where no alternative to submission is provided.
34. Bednarik v. Bednarik, supra note 20.
35. Harding v. Harding, supra note 27; Slovak v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24
N.E.2d 962 (1939); cf. Comm. v. English, supra note 15; Dale v. Beckingham, 40
N.W.2d 45 (Iowa 1949).
36. Notably New York, see SCHATCIN, Op. cit. st pra note 3, at 225.
37. See discussion, Berry v. Chaplin, supra note 11; State v. Wright, supra note 10;
State v. Datum, suopra note 18; SCHATRIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 184, "the weight of
enlightened legal authority is in favor of according decisive evidentiary effect to reliably
reported blood test exclusions . . . " (giving over two full pages of references to law
reviews, e.g., Wiener, supra note 4).
38. Jordan v. Davis, 57 A.2d 209 (Me. 1948); Berry v. Chaplin, supra note 11;
Walker v. Clark, supra note 4; Slovak v. Holod, supra note 35; 1 VicmoRE, EVIDENCE §
165a (3d ed. 1940).
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to them, on the ground that the findings were against the weight of the
evidence.3 9 Thus some courts have, in effect, granted the test results more
weight than ordinary expert opinion. As yet, no trial court has made the
tests so conclusive as to either order a directed verdict based on their
results40 or expressly limit investigation to the accuracy and skillfulness
employed in determining them."4
The jurisdiction in which the instant case was decided presents a good
example of the wavering path toward complete legal acceptance of blood
grouping tests. Even with a precedent for accepting established scientific
evidence,4 2 and a model statute empowering the trial judge to order the
tests,43 its first reported case, Bednarik v. Bednarik, 4  refused to order
them. That decision was mainly based on a case decided on self-incrimina-
tion which had been virtually overruled4', and on a constitutional clause,46
such as is found ini most states, prohibiting violations of privacy. Yet
when New Jersey's courts were again confronted with the problem ten
years later, the tests were ordered under almost identical facts.47 In the
instant case the same constitutional privileges were advanced in plaintiff's
brief, and, although they were waived on oral argument, the court made
a point of rejecting them completely, and of disapproving the Bednarik
case.-4 The court did not sustain plaintiff's refusal to submit, because
these tests may afford the assistance which a citizen has the duty to
furnish the courts in ascertaining truth.' Tbe statute was construed as
empowering a court to enforce obedience.-" Although this statute uses
permissive terms, this case limits the discretion tIus permitted to special
circumstances, as when it is proved that the tests would endanger plain-
tiff's health or that competent technicians are not available.'
Thus, blood grouping tests are made virtually mandatory in New
Jersey, since such special circumstances almost never occur. Although
the court refused to rule on whether the tests would be deemed, con-
39. Jordan v. Mace, supra note 4; Saks v. Saks, 71 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. Doam. ReL.
Ct. 1947); State v. Wright, suara note 10; Comm. v. Visocki, 23 Pa. 1). & C. 103
(1935); accord, Euclide v. State, 231 WVis. 616. 286 N.W. 3 (1939).
40. See Keeffe and Bailey, supra note 3, at 80; Comment, 1950 WASH. U. L. Q. 443.
But ef. Saks v. Saks, supra note 39 (court sitting without a jury held unchallenged test
results to be controlling).
41. Cf. State v. Hunter, 4 N.I. Super. 531, 68 A.2d 274 (1949).
42. As was done in State v. Hunter, supra note 41; State v. Carciello, 86 N.J.L.
309, 90 Atl. 1112 (1914).
43. N.J. STTr. ANN. § 2:99-4 (Curn. Supp. 1950).
44. 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.d. 80 (1940. But see ScsArxKN, o. Cit. supra, at
196 (that from 1939 to 1943 ninety tests were made in New Jersey under court order
and the twelve exclusions shown were all accepted by the courts as conclusive, citing a
personal communication from Dr. Levine).
45. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 955 (1902).
46. N.J. CoNs'r. Art. 1, par. 1.
47. Anthony v. Anthony, supra note 18.
48. Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J.S. 152, 76 A.2d 717, 720 (1950).
49. id. at 721.
50. Ibid.
51. Id. at 720.
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clusive evidence of non-paternity, the wording of its decision should serve
to discourage results contrary to the tests. It is submitted that enactment
of model statutes such as the one involved here would assist other en-
lightened courts in rendering similiarly laudable decisions.
GAMING - FUNDS SEIZED BY THE STATE
Defendants, sheriff and his deputies, raided plaintiffs' games and took
the monies from the gambling tables as evidence. Plaintiffs pleaded guilty
to gambling, paid their fines and brought this suit to recover the monies
taken. A prayer by the county for forfeiture was consolidated with this
suit. The trial court denied recovery, and also found a forfeiture contrary
to statute.' On appeal, denial of plaintiffs' right to recover was affirmed.
Held, the courts will neither aid any party whose claim is grounded in an
illegal contract or purpose, even though the suit is against one not a party
thereto, nor direct the ultimate disposition of the seized monies in face
of a statute not allowing forfeiture. Lee On v. Long, 234 P.2d 9 (Cal.
1951).
Since abolition of the early comnmon law forfeiture of all property
by conviction for a felony,2 the courts never have considered that a plaintiff
lost all his rights to the use of the courts for matters not connected with
his past illegal activity. 3 Although a violator must suffer his penalties, le
is otherwvise under the protection of the law and can demand all its remedies.'
However, the courts have steadfastly refused to aid any plaintiff to enforce
an illegal contract or purpose either as against the other party to the wrong, 5
or against one not a party where the action is necessarily founded in such
a contract or purpose." The conflict in the decisions seems to arise over
the question: when is the action founded in the illegality of the contract
or purpose? An action is not foundcd in the illegality if the plaintiff's
pleading establishes a prima facie case without mentioning the illegal con-
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2604 (1949): "No conviction of any person for crime works
any forfeiture of any property except in cases in which a forfeiture is expressly imposed
by law ... "
2. Attainder, which includes corruption of blood, forfeiture and loss of civil rights, is
not known in modern law. See Howard v. State, 28 Ariz. 433, 434, 237 Pac. 203, 204
(1925).
3. E.g., Conrioly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1901); Cook v. Ball, 144
F.2d 423 (7th-Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 761 (1945).
4. Welch v. Wesson, 71 Mass. (6 Gray) 505 (1856).
5. E.g., McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899); REsTA'rEMN'r, CONTRACTS, §
598 (1932). This broad principle, based on the maxim in Nari delicto potior est conditis
defendentis et possidentis, is claimed to have originated from the decision of "The High-
wayinan's Case", Everet v. Williams (1725), noted in 9 L. Q. Rav. 197 (1893) (an ac-
counting between highwaymen). "The vice of a maxim is that sometimes lawyers and
judges are apt to seize on it to govern cases to which if more critically examined it should
not be applied." In re Brown's Estate, 147 Kan. 395, 399, 76 P.2d 857, 860 (1938).
6. E.g., Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S.W. 178 (1906). Contra:
Matta v. Katsoulas, 192 Wis. 212, 212 N.W. 261 (1927).
